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Introduction

The arrival of Europeans in North America had a profound impact on the
Aboriginal peoples who had been living here for thousands of years. Virtually
everything changed: unfamiliar diseases like smallpox ravished the population;
the fur trade and European settlement and resource use decimated the wildlife;
new technology such as firearms altered Aboriginal economies and tribal
relations; Christian evangelism affected spiritual beliefs and values; European
imposition of sovereignty and governmental structures weakened, and in some
cases replaced, Aboriginal forms of government; and so on. 1 But more than
anything else, the taking of Aboriginal lands by Europeans has probably had
the greatest long-term impact on the Aboriginal peoples.
In some areas of Canada, a degree of consent to this taking was obtained
in the form of treaties. 2 Elsewhere - especially east of Ontario and in British
Columbia - Aboriginal lands were simply seized for incoming settlers. 3 These
discrepancies reveal both doubt (transparently self-serving) among Europeans
about whether the Aboriginal peoples had legal rights to their traditional
lands, and unevenness in the way Aboriginal land claims were actually dealt
with. But from the beginning of European colonization, there was always some
recognition of Aboriginal use and occupation of land. While French
acknowledgement of this undeniable reality tended to be revealed more in dayto-day relations with the Aboriginal peoples, 4 Britain formally recognized
Aboriginal land rights in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 5 That document
specifically reserved unceded Aboriginal lands for Aboriginal occupation and
use, and stipulated that those lands could only be acquired by the Crown at an
assembly of the Aboriginal people concerned.
While the Royal Proclamation provided a legal basis for the land
surrender treaties that followed, the issue of the nature of Aboriginal land
rights remained unsettled. Amazingly, that issue was not judicially resolved
until December, 1997, when the Supreme Court of Canada. finally produced a
legal definition of Aboriginal title in its landmark decision in Delgamuukw v
British Columbia. 6 That case involved claims by the Gitxsan (also spelled
Gitksan) and Wet'suwet'en Nations to ownership and jurisdiction over their
traditional territories. encompassing 58,000 square kilometres - an area almost
the size of New Brunswick - in northern British Columbia (see the map of the
claim area at page ). 7 The case resulted in one of the longest and most complex
trials in Canadian history, taking 318 days for presentation of the evidence and
a further 56 days for legal argument. The trial was conducted in the British
Columbia Supreme Court before Chief Justice McEachern, who produced a
book-length judgment dismissing the claims. 8 The British Columbia Court of
Appeal modified some aspects of that decision, and affirmed others. 9 On
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further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada set aside the Court of Appeal's
decision, and ordered a new trial.
Antonio Lamer, the Chief Justice of Canada, delivered the leading
judgment. 1 0 While avoiding any decision on the merits of the case, he did
outline some important principles to be applied in Aboriginal title litigation.
First of all, he specified the title's content, and explained how it can be
proved. He then looked at the test for determining when a legislative
infringement of Aboriginal title can be justified. Finally, he examined the
issue of whether the provinces have authority under the Constitution to
extinguish Aboriginal title. But even though self-government was a vital part
of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en claims, he refused to address that issue
directly. However, there is some indication in his judgment that the Court
might look favourably on a claim of self-government in an appropriate future
case.
In this lecture, I will examine the principles the Chief Justice laid down
in relation to Aboriginal title, and assess the possible impact of his decision on
Aboriginal land claims and resource development in Canada. We will see that
the decision has far-reaching implications that could lead to the economic and
political empowerment of Aboriginal peoples and to a radical restructuring of
Canadian federalism.
1.

The Content of Aboriginal Title

Prior to the Delgamuukw decision, judicial descriptions of Aboriginal title
to land were vague. In 1888, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
referred to it as "a personal and usufructuary right" 1 1 but was unwilling to give
a more precise definition. In the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973, Justice
Judson said it means that, at the time of colonization, the Aboriginal peoples
were here, "organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers
had done for centuries". 1 2 In 1984, Justice Dickson (later Chief Justice of
Canada) said that it is "best characterized by its general inalienability, coupled
with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal with the land on the
Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered [to the Crown]". 1 3 But the
courts were reluctant to say what Aboriginal title actually amounts to. The
question of whether Aboriginal peoples are entitled to the forests, minerals,
oil, and other resources on and under their lands was left unresolved.
There were two sides to this debate over the content of Aboriginal title.
Non-Aboriginal governments usually argued that it is limited to whatever uses
Aboriginal peoples made of the land prior to being influenced by Europeans.
In contrast to this, Aboriginal peoples generally contended that they are
entitled to make any use of their lands, including extraction of resources like
oil and minerals that were not utilized by them in the past. Until the
2

Delgamuukw decision, it was uncertain which way the Supreme Court of
Canada was going to come down on this issue. At trial, the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en presented evidence that they have occupied and used lands within
the claimed territories for at least 3500 years. The governments of British
Columbia and Canada contended that the evidence presented was not sufficient
to establish Aboriginal title. Moreover, even if it did establish title, the
government lawyers argued that the interest of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en in
their lands is limited to uses that were integral to their distinctive cultures
prior to contact with Europeans. 1 4
The Supreme Court did not actually decide whether the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en have Aboriginal title. Chief Justice Lamer avoided a final
determination of this issue because there were discrepancies between the way
the case had been pleaded and the way it was argued on appeal. 1 5 More
importantly, he decided that McEachern C.J. had made errors at trial in his
treatment of the oral histories of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en. Despite the
fact that these histories were vitally important to their case, McEachern C.J.
refused to admit some of them, and did not attribute independent weight to
those he was willing to admit. Chief Justice Lamer said that the courts have to
be more appreciative of "the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating
Aboriginal claims." 1 6 Quoting from his own judgment in the Van der Peet
case, decided in 1996, he said that
... a court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that
exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of Aboriginal claims, and of the
evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there
were no written records …17

As the trial judge failed to do that, his factual findings were unreliable and
could not stand. That was the main reason why the Supreme Court ordered a
new trial.
In my opinion, the most important aspect of the Delgamuukw decision for
Aboriginal peoples is the part dealing with the content of Aboriginal title. For
the first time, the Supreme Court stopped avoiding this issue, and provided a
clear picture of the title's nature. In so doing, the Court rejected the position
of British Columbia and Canada that Aboriginal title is limited to historical
uses of the land, but it also rejected the contention of the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en that it is equivalent to an inalienable fee simple estate. 1 8 The
Supreme Court affirmed earlier characterizations of Aboriginal title as sui
generis, that is, as an interest in land that is in a class of its own. 1 9 The fact
that Aboriginal title cannot be sold or transferred is one aspect of this
uniqueness. Another is the title's collective nature - it can only be held by a
community of Aboriginal people, not by individuals. The source of Aboriginal
title also distinguishes it from other land titles, which usually originate in
3

Crown grants. Because the Aboriginal peoples were here before the Crown
asserted sovereignty, their title is derived from the dual source of their prior
occupation and their pre-existing systems of law.
These sui generis aspects of Aboriginal title do not restrict the uses that
Aboriginal peoples can make of their lands. Chief Justice Lamer proclaimed
emphatically that Aboriginal title is "a right to the land itself". 2 0 It is not a
mere collection of rights to pursue activities on the land that were integral to
the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples before Europeans appeared
on the scene, as British Columbia and Canada argued. Instead, Aboriginal title
encompasses a full range of uses that need not be linked to past practices. So
Aboriginal nations can engage in mining, lumbering, oil and gas extraction,
and so on, even if they did not use their lands in those ways in the past. 2 1
But the Chief Justice did not stop there - he declared as well that the right
Aboriginal peoples have to use and occupy their lands is an exclusive right.
This means that Aboriginal peoples are not just free to determine for
themselves what uses they will make of their lands; they also have as much
right as any landholder to prevent others - and this includes governments from intruding on and using their lands without their consent. Indeed, they
should have even greater protection against government intrusion than other
landholders because their Aboriginal rights have been recognized and affirmed
by the Constitution, 2 2 whereas the property rights of other landholders have
not. In my opinion the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the proprietary
nature and constitutional status of Aboriginal title, did not assign adequate
significance to these factors. We will come back to this matter later, as it
relates to another issue - namely, infringement.
While describing Aboriginal title as a right of exclusive use and
occupation of land, the Supreme Court did place an inherent limitation on the
purposes for which Aboriginal title lands can be used. The limitation is this:
Lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is
irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis
of the group's claim to Aboriginal title.23

Chief Justice Lamer linked this limitation to the dual source of Aboriginal title
in prior occupation of land and pre-existing systems of Aboriginal law. He
emphasized the importance of maintaining the continuity between the historic
patterns of occupation which are the basis of Aboriginal title, and present- day
uses. So Aboriginal peoples cannot use their lands in ways that would prevent
their special relationship with the land from continuing into the future. The
Chief Justice gave two examples to illustrate this point. First, if the occupation
necessary for establishing Aboriginal title is proven by showing that the land
was used as a hunting ground, it cannot be used today in ways that would
4

destroy its value for hunting - so strip mining, for instance, would be
precluded. Secondly,
.. if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or
cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that
relationship (e.g. by developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps
by turning it into a parking lot).24

These examples have added significance because they suggest that proof of a
ceremonial or cultural connection with land, or of use of it as a hunting
ground, can be sufficient to establish Aboriginal title. This relates to the
matter of proof, to be discussed below.
To the extent that the inherent limitation on Aboriginal title precludes
uses that would destroy the value of the land for future generations, it probably
accords with the understanding Aboriginal people generally have of their own
responsibilities. 2 5 But the connection the Chief Justice made between their
historic relationship to the land and uses they can make of it today concerns
me because it suggests that Aboriginal peoples may be prisoners of the past.
Lamer C.J. tried to dispel this kind of concern by emphasizing that the
limitation does not restrict use to activities traditionally carried out on the
land. "That", he said, "would amount to a legal straitjacket on Aboriginal
peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land" 2 6 He added that his
approach "allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an
overarching limit, defined by the special nature of the Aboriginal title in that
land." 2 7
But to what extent is the "special nature" of Aboriginal title tied to the
past? The Chief Justice did not answer this question directly. But if I
understand him correctly, what he seems to have had in mind is this: on the
one hand, present uses are not limited to historic uses, but on the other,
present uses that would preclude historic uses, or destroy an Aboriginal
people's special relationship with the land, are not permitted. In other words,
present uses are not restricted to, but they are restricted by, past practices and
traditions.
So what if an Aboriginal society has changed so that its members no
longer use their lands as they once did - they now have a different relationship
with the land, which is still special to them, but is not historically based? Are
they still restricted by past practices and traditions that no one is interested in
following any more? In that hypothetical situation, which Chief Justice Lamer
does not seem to have considered, I would say no. From a logical perspective,
maintenance of the restrictions would make little sense, though I suppose it
would preserve the option of returning to the abandoned practices and
traditions in the future. More disturbingly, isn't it paternalistic for the Supreme
5

Court to impose restrictions on Aboriginal title in the interests of cultural
preservation - which seems to be what this is all about - if the Aboriginal
community in question does not want them? This brings me to the issue of
self-government, which in my opinion provides a way out of this dilemma.
2.

Aboriginal Self-Government

As already mentioned, Chief Justice Lamer expressly avoided the issue of
self-government, even though it was a vital part of the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en claims. His reason for doing so was that
.. the errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial,
make it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to selfgovernment has been made out.28

The Chief Justice was not even willing to outline any general principles on
self-government to guide future litigation. However, a careful reading of his
decision reveals that, for theoretical and practical reasons, self-government is
essential for his conception of Aboriginal title to work.
We have seen that the Chief Justice said that pre-existing systems of
Aboriginal law are a source of Aboriginal title to land. He therefore
acknowledged that the Aboriginal peoples had legal systems, which presupposes forms of government, prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America. Those legal systems and forms of government did not simply
disappear when the French and British Crowns proclaimed sovereignty over
what is now Canada. They continued to function in varying degrees, 2 9 and
regulated the internal affairs and external relations of the Aboriginal nations. 3 0
In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. acknowledged the existence of decision-making
authority in present-day Aboriginal communities, insofar as their land rights
are concerned. After affirming that Aboriginal land is held communally by all
the members of an Aboriginal nation, he added that "[d]ecisions with respect
to that land are also made by that community." 3 1 When one thinks about it, this
decision-making authority has to accompany communal land use rights, as how
would resources be managed and distributed within the community without it?
In the absence of community controls, there might be a free-for-all scramble
for resources - an Aboriginal version of the "tragedy of the commons". 3 2 And
decision- making authority must entail a community structure for making
decisions - in short, some form of self-government. 3 3
As suggested above, self-government provides a solution to the dilemma
created by the inherent limitation Chief Justice Lamer placed on Aboriginal
title. We have seen that this limitation prevents Aboriginal lands from being
used in ways that are inconsistent with an Aboriginal nation's connection with
the land. But the nature of that connection must be allowed to change over
6

time so that Aboriginal peoples are not made prisoners of their own pasts.
Canadian courts should not sit in judgment over social change in Aboriginal
communities, deciding what is and what is not necessary for their cultural
preservation. 3 4 That kind of paternalism is self-defeating because it destroys
the autonomy that is necessary for Aboriginal communities to thrive as
dynamic cultural and political entities. Any internal limitations on Aboriginal
title in the interests of cultural preservation should be determined by
Aboriginal nations themselves through the exercise of self-government within
their communities - they should not be imposed by Canadian courts. 3 5
3.

Proof of Aboriginal Title

In order to establish Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer said that
Aboriginal people must prove that they occupied the claimed land at the time
the Crown asserted sovereignty, and that the occupation was exclusive. The
date of Crown assertion of sovereignty is the relevant time because, in his
words, "Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title", and "it
does not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that
title existed." 3 6 Also, the date of sovereignty is generally more certain than the
date of first contact with Europeans, which was the time the Court designated
in Van der Peet for proof of other Aboriginal rights. 3 7 The Chief Justice
distinguished Aboriginal title from other Aboriginal rights, such as a right to
hunt or fish, because Aboriginal title arises from occupation of land, whereas
other Aboriginal rights do not. At common law, occupation of land, in and of
itself, is sufficient to establish title. 3 8
What, then, is required to prove occupation of land? In the context of
Aboriginal title, Chief Justice Lamer said that both the common law and the
Aboriginal perspective have to be taken into account. At common law, any acts
in relation to land that indicate an intention to hold it for one's own purposes
are evidence of occupation. 3 9 In assessing these acts, "the conditions of life
and the habits and ideas of the people" in question are relevant. 4 0 Quoting
from Professor Brian Slattery, the Chief Justice said that, "[i]n considering
whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established, 'one must take into
account the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and technological
abilities, and the character of the lands claimed'". 4 1 Regarding the Aboriginal
perspective, Lamer C.J. added that Aboriginal laws, including but not limited
to land tenure systems or land use laws, are also relevant to establishing
occupation at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty. So while the issue to be
determined is whether the lands were occupied at that time, both physical
presence and Aboriginal law can be used to prove it.
The Chief Justice acknowledged that "[c]onclusive evidence of presovereignty occupation may be difficult to come by." 4 2 So he said that
7

evidence of present occupation could be presented as proof of pre-sovereignty
occupation." In that case there would have to be continuity between the two,
but this does not require 4 3 an unbroken chain of continuity", as long as there
has been "'substantial maintenance of the connection' between the people and
the land." 4 4 Occupation, he said, "may have been disrupted for a time, perhaps
as a result of the unwillingness of European colonizers to recognize Aboriginal
title." 4 5 So disruptions in continuity, especially when due to European
violation of Aboriginal rights, do not preclude present-day Aboriginal title.
As we have seen, for Aboriginal title to be established the occupation at
the time of assertion of sovereignty must have been exclusive. Chief Justice
Lamer explained that, because the right of use and occupation entailed by
Aboriginal title is exclusive, the occupation necessary to prove it must have
been exclusive as well. However, he observed that "[e]xclusivity is a common
law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be
imported into the concept of Aboriginal title with caution." 4 6 In this regard,
the Aboriginal perspective once again needs to be accorded as much weight as
the common law perspective. Also, joint Aboriginal title can be shared by two
or more Aboriginal nations by application of the concept of shared exclusivity.
This would occur, for example, where "two Aboriginal nations lived on a
particular piece of land and recognized each other's entitlement to that land
but nobody else's." 4 7
4

Infringement of Aboriginal Title

Although earlier decisions had intimated as much, 4 8 Delgamuukw made
clear that Aboriginal title is a real property right - in Chief Justice Lamer's
words, it is "the right to the land itself." 4 9 We have seen that it is also an
exclusive right, which means that Aboriginal titleholders can keep others from
intruding on their lands. 5 0 As a result, any such intrusion, unless authorized by
law, would be an actionable trespass. Stated more broadly, as a property right
Aboriginal title is entitled to as much legal protection as any other property
right in Canada.
But Aboriginal title is not just a property right - it is also a
constitutionally protected right. Because it is recognized and affirmed as an
Aboriginal right by section 35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982, 5 1 it is accorded
protection against government interference that no other property rights in
Canada enjoy. However, this protection, like the protection accorded to
fundamental rights by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is not absolute. In
R. v. Sparrow, 5 2 decided in 1990, the Supreme Court held that Aboriginal
rights can be infringed by federal legislation that meets a strict test of
justification. This test requires the government to prove that there is a valid
legislative objective behind the infringement, and that the fiduciary duty the
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Crown owes to the Aboriginal peoples has been respected. In Sparrow, the
Court said that the legislative objective must be "compelling and substantial",
and that respect for the fiduciary duty means that Aboriginal rights must be
given priority over non-Aboriginal interests. 5 3 This priority is in keeping with
the constitutional status of Aboriginal rights, which, to borrow a metaphor
from Ronald Dworkin, allows them to "trump" other rights that are not
constitutionally protected. 5 4 The Court also stated that, in some circumstances,
consultation with the Aboriginal people whose rights are involved will have to
take place before measures infringing the rights are adopted. 5 5
However, in decisions since Sparrow the Supreme Court has watered
down the protection accorded to Aboriginal rights to such an extent that, in my
opinion, their constitutional status has been seriously undermined. It seemed
clear from Sparrow that Aboriginal rights can only be overridden in
exceptional circumstances, as one would expect where constitutional rights are
concerned, and then only by means of or pursuant to legislation. 5 6 In that case,
the Aboriginal right in question was a right to fish for food, societal and
ceremonial purposes. The Court decided that federal regulations could limit
this right if necessary for the valid legislative purpose of conserving fish
stocks. In other words, infringement would be justified if the government had
no other viable options for conserving this vital resource. The government
could not, however, justify an infringement of the right just because that
would be in the "public interest". Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest,
delivering the unanimous judgment, put it this way:
We find the 'public interest' justification to be so vague as to provide no
meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the
justification of a limitation on constitutional rights.57

However, when the Court revisited this issue six years later in the Gladstone
case, it did endorse public interest justifications, though not quite in the broad
terms rejected in Sparrow. Delivering the majority judgment, Chief Justice
Lamer said that, because
.. Aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and
economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are circumstances
in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial importance to
that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that Aboriginal societies
are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be justifiable.58

Taken by itself, this passage does not suggest that public interest alone is a
sufficient justification for overriding Aboriginal rights, but when one looks at
the kinds of objectives that Lamer C.J. was willing to characterize as
compelling and substantial, that seems to be the result.

9

To give this some context, we need to be aware that Gladstone involved a
commercia l Aboriginal fishing right, specifically a right to sell herring spawn
on kelp in large quantities. This distinguished it from Sparrow , which involved
an Aboriginal right to fish mainly for food. In Gladstone , Lamer C.J. decided
that a commercial Aboriginal fishing right does not have complete priority
over other fishing. 5 9 So after necessary conservation has been provided for,
how is the fish resource to be allocated among the various users? The Chief
Justice said that, while commercial fishing pursuant to an Aboriginal right still
has to be given some priority, government allocation of the resource can take
into account
.. objectives such as the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the
recognition of the historic reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by nonAboriginal groups.60

What he seems to be suggesting here is that, in the interests of "economic and
regional fairness", the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples can be
infringed by legislation for the purpose of distributing some of the resource to
others. Since when, I would like to know, can constitutional rights be
overridden for the economic benefit of private persons who do not have
equivalent rights? Isn't this turning the Constitution on its head by allowing
interests that are not constitutional to trump rights that are? 6 1
Justice McLachlin recognized these problems in her forceful dissent in
Van der Peet, where she discussed Chief Justice Lamer's judgment in
Gladstone. For one thing, she found his approach to be inconsistent with
Sparrow because it extended the meaning of "compelling and substantial", in
her words, "to any goal which can be justified for the good of the community
as a whole, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal." 6 2 She continued.
The extension of the concept of compelling objective to matters like economic and
regional fairness and the interests of non-Aboriginal fishers .. would negate the
very Aboriginal right to fish itself, on the ground that this is required for the
reconciliation of Aboriginal rights and other interests and the consequent good of
the community as a whole.63

For her, this would permit the Crown to "convey a portion of an Aboriginal
fishing right to others, not by treaty or with the consent of the Aboriginal
people, but by its own unilateral act. 6 4 She found this to be not only
unacceptable, but also unconstitutional. 6 5 I agree.
Chief Justice Lamer appears to have been oblivious to these objections, as
he relied heavily on Gladstone in his discussion of infringement in
Delgamuukw. From Sparrow and Gladstone he extracted general principles
governing justification for infringement of Aboriginal rights, which he then
applied to Aboriginal title. In particular, he pointed out that most of the
10

legislative objectives that may justify infringement "can be traced to the
reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by Aboriginal peoples
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty". 6 6 He added that reconciliation
"entails the recognition that 'distinctive Aboriginal societies exist within, and
are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community." 6 7 He then
made a remarkable statement that reveals how little the constitutional
protection of Aboriginal title really means:
In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric
power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia,
protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure
and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of
objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the
infringement of Aboriginal title.68

Let us be clear about what the Chief Justice had in mind here. If the
government thinks the development of agriculture is sufficiently important, it
can settle "foreign populations" (by which he must have meant non-Aboriginal
Canadians) on Aboriginal lands, even though that would be a clear
infringement of Aboriginal title. In other words, replacement of Aboriginal
peoples who do not farm with Canadians who do can be justifiable, even
though this is an infringement of the Aboriginal peoples' constitutional rights.
This sounds very much like a familiar justification for dispossessing
Aboriginal peoples in the heyday of European colonialism in eastern North
America - agriculturalists are superior to hunters and gatherers, and so can
take their lands. 6 9 But Lamer C.J. was not referring to the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries - he was talking about the present day, as justification for
infringement only became relevant after Aboriginal rights were
constitutionalized in 1982!
Development of forestry and mining are two more examples Lamer C.J.
gave of objectives that would justify infringing Aboriginal title. Now we all
know who, for the most part, engages in these kinds of resource development
today - large, usually multinational, corporations. So what the Chief Justice
appears to have envisaged here is government authorized intrusion onto
Aboriginal lands to serve the economic interests of large corporations. If this
is justifiable for the good of the community as a whole, then Lamer C.J. seems
to subscribe to the view that what is good for large corporations is good for
Canada, and if it is good for Canada then Aboriginal rights can be brushed
aside.
To put this in context, we need to think about how private, nonAboriginal lands are treated by governments in Canada. Has anyone ever heard
of someone's ranch or resort land being taken by the government and
transferred to someone else because it would be economically beneficial to the
11

community for the land to be farmed If a private landowner decides not to
develop his or her land, is it justifiable for the government to take it away and
grant it to a corporation because it contains valuable timber or minerals? Of
course not. Governments can only expropriate land for public purposes, such
as highways and airports, and then only if they have clear statutory authority to
do so. 7 0 They have no power to take someone's land and grant it to someone
else, even if that might be good for the community. 7 1 Protection of private
property from this kind of interference happens to be a fundamental tenet of
our English law system, and has been ever since Magna Carta. 7 2
But from what Lamer C.J. said about infringement and justification in
Delgamuukw, it sounds like Aboriginal title lands are more vulnerable to
government interference than private lands. How can this be? We have seen
that Aboriginal title is constitutionally protected in Canada, whereas private
property rights are not. The whole purpose of constitutionalizing rights is to
place them beyond government infringement, except in exceptional
circumstances. In 1982, a conscious choice was made to provide that
protection to Aboriginal rights but not to private property rights. So how is it
that Aboriginal rights have now become more vulnerable? With respect, for me
this aspect of Lamer C.J.'s judgment is simply perverse.
There are, however, a couple of qualifiers in the part of Lamer C.J.'s
judgment on infringement that may serve as checks on the broad governmental
power over Aboriginal title that he apparently endorsed. First, following
Sparrow 7 3 he held that one consequence of the Crown's fiduciary duty is that
Aboriginal peoples must be consulted before infringements of their Aboriginal
title will be justifiable. 7 4 This requirement of consultation would result in "the
involvement of Aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their
lands." 7 5 The extent of the requisite involvement apparently depends on the
severity of the infringement. Lamer C.J. put it this way:
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the circumstances.
In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no
more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to
lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when
the minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the
Aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be significantly
deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an
Aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing
regulations in relation to Aboriginal lands.76

His suggestion that mere consultation would not fulfill the Crown's fiduciary
duty in most cases, and that full Aboriginal consent would be necessary in
some situations, does allow for significant Aboriginal participation in
12

decision-making regarding their lands, and for a veto power where the
infringement of their Aboriginal title is sufficiently serious.
The other qualifier that could act as a practical deterrent to infringement
is what Lamer C.J. called the "economic aspect" of Aboriginal title. 7 7 As we
have seen, he held that Aboriginal title entails a right to exclusive use and
occupation, encompassing resources both on and under the land, including
timber and minerals. 7 8 After saying that the economic aspect is particularly
relevant "when one takes into account the modem uses to which lands held
pursuant to Aboriginal title can be put, he continued.
The economic aspect of Aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant to
the question of justification as well, a possibility suggested in Sparrow and which I
repeated in Gladstone. Indeed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty are a
well-established part of the landscape of Aboriginal rights: Guerin. In keeping with
the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will ordinarily
be required when Aboriginal title is infringed. The amount of compensation
payable will vary with the nature of the particular Aboriginal title affected and with
the nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to which Aboriginal
interests were accommodated.79

So infringement of Aboriginal title is not without cost. Aboriginal peoples
have a right to compensation for any loss they incur as a result of
infringement. Moreover, as Lamer C.J. linked this right to the fiduciary duty
which is integral to the constitutional status of Aboriginal title, it would seem
that the obligation to pay compensation is constitutional. 8 0 This means that it
cannot be avoided by legislation. 8 1 Given that Aboriginal title includes natural
resources, any infringement of it for the purpose of developing those resources
could result in expensive compensation payments. When one combines this
right to compensation with the duty to consult, what emerges from the part of
Lamer C.J.'s judgment on infringement is an emphasis on Aboriginal
participation in resource development. 8 2
Throughout his discussion of infringement, Lamer C.J. seems to have
taken for granted that provincial legislatures as well as the federal Parliament
can infringe Aboriginal title, provided they are able to meet the justification
test. 8 3 But as we are about to see, this appears to be in direct conflict with
another part of his judgment, dealing with Aboriginal title and federalism.
5.

Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction over Aboriginal Title

Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 8 4 divided governmental
powers between the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures.
Section 91(24) assigned exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians", to Parliament. The Delgamuukw decision resolved a
long-standing debate over whether the words "Lands reserved for the Indians"
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include lands held by Aboriginal title. 8 5 Chief Justice Lamer decided, on the
basis of his interpretation of earlier authority and for public policy reasons, 8 6
that Aboriginal title lands are included under that constitutional head of
power.
So what are the implications of this? The Chief Justice said explicitly that
this means that the provinces, since Confederation, have been unable to
extinguish Aboriginal title. But as mentioned previously, he nonetheless
suggested that the provinces can infringe Aboriginal title, provided they justify
the infringement by meeting the Sparrow and Gladstone test. 8 7 This is also
apparent from his examples of infringement for the purposes of agriculture,
forestry, and mining, all of which come primarily under provincial jurisdiction.
But how, one might ask, can the provinces infringe Aboriginal title for any of
these purposes if it is under exclusive federal jurisdiction?
Surprisingly, Chief Justice Lamer did not even mention, let alone answer,
this question. I nonetheless think that the correct response is that they cannot.
This response is based on the constitutional principle of interjurisdictional
immunity, which prevents the provinces from enacting legislation in relation to
matters that are under exclusive federal jurisdiction. 8 8 In Delgamuukw , Lamer
C.J. accepted the application of this principle to Aboriginal title, given that it
is a federal matter. 8 9 So to the extent that provincial laws are in relation to
land, they cannot apply to "lands reserved for the Indians", including
Aboriginal title lands.
There is an extensive, well-settled body of case law excluding the
application of provincial laws to one category of these section 91(24) lands,
namely, Indian reserves. Every case I am aware of on this issue - and this
includes Supreme Court of Canada decisions - has held that, to the extent that
provincial laws relate to use and possession of lands, they cannot apply to
reserve lands. 9 0 This case law clearly applies to Aboriginal title lands, as
Lamer C.J., in Delgamuukw , specifically adopted an earlier judicial statement
that the interest in reserve and Aboriginal title lands is the same. 9 1 In both
instances, the Aboriginal interest entails a right to exclusive use and
occupation. The reason why provincial laws relating to use and occupation
cannot apply on reserves is precisely because those laws would interfere with
that Aboriginal interest. If this is the case for reserve lands, it must be the case
for Aboriginal title lands as well. 9 2
How, then, was Chief Justice Lamer able to conclude that provincial laws
can infringe Aboriginal title, particularly if the infringement involved
something as intrusive as engaging in agriculture, forestry or mining on
Aboriginal lands? It is perfectly obvious that activities like these would
interfere with the Aboriginal titleholders' right of exclusive use and
occupation. Frankly, I do not have an answer to this. It appears to be an
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oversight, a case of the left hand having forgotten what the right hand has
done. The Supreme Court will have to return to this issue in the future, and
resolve this glaring contradiction.
So how might the Court resolve this? 9 3 In my opinion, it will be virtually
impossible for the Court to backtrack on its conclusion that Aboriginal title
comes under exclusive federal jurisdiction. As its motivation for doing so
would obviously be to rescue provincial power to infringe Aboriginal title, it
would leave itself wide open to attack for changing its mind for political and
economic reasons, at the expense of legal principle and to the detriment of
Aboriginal rights. That would not engender respect for the Court by Aboriginal
peoples, nor, I would expect, by other fair-minded Canadians. Instead, I think
the Court will be obliged to accept the consequences of its decision that
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. This means that, to
the extent that infringements; of Aboriginal title can be justified - and we have
seen that there are major problems with the Court's approach to that as well the power to do so is exclusively federal.
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Conclusion

So has the Supreme Court finally got the definition of Aboriginal title
right? My answer, as is probably obvious by now, is an equivocal lawyer's
response - yes and no. On the yes side, with some reservations I think the
Court's approach to the issues of proof and content of Aboriginal title is
basically correct. 9 4 What Aboriginal people have to show is exclusive
occupation of land at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty. Occupation
here is evaluated by reference to their own societies and their own ways of
using the land, not by European standards. Joint occupation by more than one
Aboriginal nation is also recognized. On content of Aboriginal title, the Court
has acknowledged that it is a right to exclusive use and occupation, for a full
range of purposes that are not limited to historic uses. This is in keeping with
common law principles, which have never limited the uses an occupant can
make of land to the uses relied upon to establish the occupation. 9 5 The
inherent limitation excluding uses that are irreconcilable with the nature of the
particular Aboriginal people's attachment to the land may be problematic, but
as we have seen this will depend on whether the Court allows for
modifications to the nature of that attachment over time, through cultural
change and the exercise of powers of self-government.
However, in its treatment of the issue of infringement of Aboriginal title,
I think the Supreme Court made serious errors. The suggestion that Aboriginal
title can be infringed in the interests of economic development, benefiting
private persons and corporations, disregards the special protection accorded to
property rights by English law for close to 800 years. Moreover, Aboriginal
title, unlike other property rights, is also protected against government
interference by the Canadian Constitution, a fact that was acknowledged but
not given sufficient importance by the Court.
Finally, there are the matters of provincial infringement of Aboriginal
title and the constitutional division of powers. As we have seen, Chief Justice
Lamer's inference that provincial legislatures can infringe Aboriginal title is in
stark contradiction to his ruling that Aboriginal title is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Parliament. I have no doubt that the Court will have to take a
second look at this issue, and I hope this contradiction will be resolved in a
way that respects both constitutional principles and Aboriginal rights.
Overall, there can be no doubt that Delgamuukw is a landmark decision.
As the full impact of it sinks in, it will have a dramatic effect, especially in
areas of Canada where land cession treaties or land claims agreements have
not yet been signed. By specifying that "Aboriginal title encompasses the right
to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a
variety of purposes", 9 6 it helps to level the playing field between Aboriginal
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peoples and non-Aboriginal governments in the negotiation of land claims. 9 7 It
could also alter the nature of those negotiations very significantly. In the land
claims agreements that have been signed since the federal government
instituted a land claims policy in 1973, 9 8 the Aboriginal parties have generally
been obliged to surrender their Aboriginal title to the entire land claim area, in
return for security of tenure in the form of recognized title to a portion of it,
and other benefits. 9 9 At the time they were signed, these agreements may have
been reasonable compromises, given the uncertainty over the meaning of
Aboriginal title. That uncertainty no longer exists. Given that the Supreme
Court has finally accepted that Aboriginal title is the right to exclusive use and
occupation, and includes natural resources, why should Aboriginal people be
willing to surrender Aboriginal title to any of their Aboriginal lands? As a
result of Delgamuukw, they already have the security of tenure and entitlement
to natural resources that they sought in earlier agreements.
So why negotiate land claims agreements at all? In my opinion, there are
two reasons for doing so. First of all, after Delgamuukw Aboriginal people
still have to prove that they have Aboriginal title. 1 0 0 While the decision did
remove the uncertainty over the meaning of Aboriginal title, it did not resolve
the issue of which Aboriginal peoples have title to what lands. The decision
did not even resolve that matter for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en - that is why
the case was sent back to trial. To avoid the protracted, expensive litigation
that would be required to establish Aboriginal title in court, it is advisable for
Aboriginal peoples to try to resolve the issues of the existence and
geographical extent of their Aboriginal title through negotiations with the
federal and provincial governments. 1 0 1 If those governments refuse to take
sufficient account of the Delgamuukw decision in the negotiations, or display
other instances of bad faith, then the Aboriginal peoples always have the
option of going to court.
A second reason for negotiating is that, although Aboriginal peoples are
entitled to the resources on and under their lands, the inalienability of
Aboriginal title 1 0 2 may prevent them from developing those resources without
the cooperation of the federal government. This feature of Aboriginal title
may, for example, prevent Aboriginal titleholders from entering into
leaseholds or resource extraction agreements with corporations that have the
expertise and capital to develop the resources. While there would appear to be
no legal impediment preventing Aboriginal peoples from developing these
resources on their own (as long as they do not violate the inherent limitation
on their title 1 0 3 ), this may not be a realistic option, at least in the short term,
for Aboriginal peoples who do not have the necessary human and financial
resources. So for Aboriginal peoples who are interested in developing the
resources on their lands, negotiation of agreements with the federal and
provincial governments may be unavoidable.
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In the meantime we have seen that, given exclusive federal jurisdiction
over Aboriginal rights, the provinces should not be able to infringe Aboriginal
title. Without Aboriginal consent, provincially authorized resource
development on lands subject to Aboriginal claims therefore poses substantial
risks. If Aboriginal title to those lands is subsequently established, the
province and the developer could be liable for damages for trespass. 1 0 4 In
circumstances where the province and the developer had prior notice of those
claims, punitive damages as well as damages for actual loss might be
appropriate, especially where disruption to Aboriginal ways of life has
occurred that cannot be repaired and cannot be assessed in monetary terms. As
those damages might far outweigh the benefits of the trespass, provincial
governments and developers should think twice before engaging in resource
development or other use of lands that are subject to Aboriginal claims.
Acting under the authority conferred on it by section 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, we have seen that the Parliament of Canada can
infringe Aboriginal title as long as the infringement can be justified. On the
basis of the Delgamuukw decision, it would therefore seem that Parliament
could authorize resource development on Aboriginal title lands. 1 0 5 But for that
to be justified, at the very least there would have to be consultation with the
Aboriginal titleholders, and in some instances their consent would have to be
obtained. Moreover, compensation would have to be paid to them for any
violation of their Aboriginal title. If the benefit of the infringement went to a
province or to a resource developer, what incentive would there be for the
federal government to incur the cost of paying compensation? 1 0 6 So from a
practical perspective, the more viable alternative would be for agreements to
be negotiated with the Aboriginal peoples for resource development on their
lands. For these agreements to be valid, the federal government would have to
be a party. But where the lands are located within provincial boundaries, the
province would need to be involved as well. 1 0 7
Negotiated agreements are the means by which Aboriginal land claims
have been dealt with in Canada historically, originally by treaties and more
recently by land claims agreements. This approach respects the Aboriginal
peoples and their authority to make decisions regarding their lands, whereas
non-consensual infringement of their Aboriginal title by federal legislation
does not. Legislative infringement is a coercive act that should only be used in
emergencies or as a last resort where a compelling and substantial objective is
at stake, and the Aboriginal titleholders refuse good-faith negotiations.
Moreover, there is no valid reason why negotiations need result in an absolute
surrender of Aboriginal title. 1 0 8 Aboriginal people should be able to participate
in negotiations for the development of their lands without being compelled to
give up their title. 1 0 9
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Despite its shortcomings, the Delgamuukw decision could usher in a new
era for Aboriginal rights in Canada. For the first time, the right of Aboriginal
peoples to participate as equal partners in resource development on Aboriginal
lands has been acknowledged. But for this new partnership to work, the
federal and provincial governments will have to shed outdated attitudes, and
accept the new legal landscape. 1 1 0 This will take political courage, leadership,
and imagination. The Canadian public as well needs to he aware of the unique
position of the Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society, and accept the fact that
they have special rights as the original inhabitants of this country. Over and
over in his recent decisions on Aboriginal rights, Chief Justice Lamer has
emphasized the need for reconciliation. Public support for governments that
have the vision to negotiate just agreements with Aboriginal peoples for a
sharing of this country's resources will help to achieve the kind of
reconciliation he seems to have in mind.

19

ENDNOTES
1. See generally J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens.- A History of Indian-White
Relations in Canada, rev'd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Olive Patricia
Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Years
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992); Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: IndianEuropean Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1992).
2. See Darlene Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands in Canada.- Consent or Coercion?
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1989); Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (hereinafter RCAP Report), Vol. 1, Looking Forward,
Looking Back (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), 119-79.
3. E.g. see Leslie F.S. Upton, Micmacs and Colonists., Indian- White Relations in the
Maritimes, 1713-1867 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979); Paul
Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics., The Indian Land Question in British Columbia,
1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990).
4. See Brian Slattery, "French Claims in North America 1500-59" (1978) 59 Canadian
Historical Review 139; W.J. Eccles, "Sovereignty-Association, 1500-1783" (1984) 65
Canadian Historical Review 475; Cornelius J. Jaenen, "French Sovereignty and Native
Nationhood During the French Regime", in J.R. Miller, ed. Sweet Promises. A Reader on
Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 19.
5. R.S.C. 1985, App. IL No. 1. See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian
Peoples, as Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979); Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North
America to 1763 and an Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa:
Research Branch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1981); John Borrows, "Constitutional
Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation" (1994)
28 University of British Columbia Law Review 1.
6. [1998]1 C.N.L.R. 14 (hereinafter Delgamuukw).
7. On appeal, the claimants modified their claim from ownership and jurisdiction to
Aboriginal title and self-government: see ibid., at 44-45 (para. 73).
8. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185.
9. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470.
10. Cory and Major JJ. concurred with Lamer C.J. La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dube J.
concurring, wrote a separate judgment arriving at the same result, but differing somewhat on
content and proof of Aboriginal title. McLachlin J. concurred with the Chief Justice, and
added that she was "also in substantial agreement with the comments of Justice La Forest":
20

Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 94 (para. 209). Given that Lamer C.J.'s judgment was
concurred in by a majority of the Court, I am going to confine my discussion to his decision.
11. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46
(hereinafter St. Catherine's Milling), at 54.
12. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at 328.
13. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (hereinafter Guerin), at 382.
14. The government lawyers relied upon R.. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 177
(hereinafter Van der Peet), where the Supreme Court of Canada created this "integral to the
distinctive culture" test to determine the existence of other Aboriginal rights, in that case a
right to fish.
15. In the pleadings, the land claims had been brought by 51 Chiefs on behalf of themselves
and their Houses (social and political units within Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en societies),
whereas on appeal these claims were "amalgamated into two communal claims, one advanced
on behalf of each nation": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 45 (para. 73).
16. Ibid., at 47 (para. 80).
17. Ibid., quoting from Van der Peet, supra note 14, at 207 (para. 68) (Lamer C.J.'s
emphasis).
18. A fee simple estate is the greatest interest in land available under the common law, and is
virtually the same as ownership.
19. See Guerin, supra note 13, per Dickson J. at 382; Canadian Pacific Limited v. Paul,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 (hereinafter Canadian Pacific), at 678. For discussion, see John Borrows
and Leonard I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a
Difference?" (1997) 36 Alberta Law Review 9.
20. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 68 (para. 140) (Lamer C.J.'s emphasis). Lamer C.J. said
this not just once, but twice: see also 67 (para. 138).
21. Some commentators have suggested that the Delgamuukw decision, especially on this
issue of the content of Aboriginal title, is a radical departure from established law: see Gordon
Gibson, "[need title]", Globe and Mail, 16 December 1997, [page no. = A?]; Owen Lippert,
[need title]", Vancouver Sun, 19 December 1997, [page no.?]. Scholarly research, however,
reveals that this is simply not so. On the contrary, the decision conforms with long-standing
common law principles and precedents of the highest authority: see Kent McNeil, "The
Meaning of Aboriginal Title" (hereinafter "Meaning of Aboriginal Title'), in Michael Asch,
ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada. Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for
Difference (Vancouver.- University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 135; Kent McNeil,
"Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?" (1997) 36 Alberta Law
21

Review 117; Hamar Foster, "Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 'Invented Law'?" (1998) 56 The Advocate 221-31.
22. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
(U.K.) 1982, c.11, provides: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
23. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 62 (para. 124).
24. Ibid., at 63-64 (para. 128).
25. E.g. see R CAP Report, supra note 2, Vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship, 434-64.
26. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 65 (para. 132).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., at 80 (para. 170).
29. However, suppression of Aboriginal governments by the Indian Act (first enacted in 1876,
now R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5) and its predecessors did lead to the replacement of Aboriginal forms
of government with the band council system in many cases: see generally Richard H. Bartlett,
Indian Act of Canada, 2nd ed. (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre,
1988); John S. Molloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional
Change ", in Miller, supra note 4, 145; RCAP Report, supra note 2, Vol. 1, Looking Forward,
Looking Back, 255-332. In other cases, traditional forms of government have continued to
function alongside this imposed system: see Darlene M. Johnston, "The Quest of the Six
Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44 University of Toronto Faculty of Law
Review 1.
30. External relations would include dealings with the British Crown and the Canadian
government, as occurred when treaties were signed. see Delia Opekokew, The First Nations.,
Indian Government and the Canadian Federation (Saskatoon: Federation of Saskatchewan
Indians, 1980), 9-21; James [sake'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Empowering Treaty
Federalism" (1994) 58 Saskatchewan Law Review 241; RC,AP Report, supra note 2, Vol. 1,
Looking Forward, Looking Back, 155-76.
31. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 59 (para. 115).
32. See Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 1
recognize that Aboriginal values and customs may operate to keep individual exploitation of
resources in check in some communities without the necessity of formal mechanisms of
enforcement: e.g. see Fikret Berkes, "Fishery Resource Use in a Subarctic Indian Community"
(1977) 5 Human Ecology 289; and, more generally, David Feeny, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J.

22

McCay, and James M. Acheson, "The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later"
(1990) 18 Human Ecology 1; David Feeny, Susan Hanna, and Arthur F. McEvoy,
"Questioning the Assumptions of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' Model of Fisheries" (1996)
72 Land Economics 187 (I am grateful to Professor Kenneth Avio for bringing this possibility
to my attention). However, in today's world where Aboriginal people are subjected to the
influences and pressures of the acquisitive culture around them, these internalized social
controls may not be sufficient.
33. See also infra note 97. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in
Canada.- From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (hereinafter "Aboriginal Rights in
Canada"), forthcoming, Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law. This is not to
say that the forms of government in Aboriginal communities need to replicate the authority
structures in Euro-Canadian society: see generally Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, "Tribal
Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native
Indians", in Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, eds., Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples
and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 333; Russel Barsh, "The
Nature and Spirit of North American Political Systems" (1986) 10 American Indian Quarterly
181; Menno Boldt, Surviving as Indians The Challenge of Self-Government (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993), esp. 117-66; and, more generally, Bruce L. Benson, The
Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for
Public Policy, 1990), esp. 11-36.
34. Lamer C.J.'s approach to cultural preservation seems to be rooted in the false notion that
tradition is necessarily historical in nature. Patricia Monture-Angus dispels this notion by
providing a Mohawk perspective on the meaning of "traditional" in her book, Thunder in My
Soul A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995), at 244 note 4:
A word of caution is necessary regarding my use of the word traditional. This
word is frequently misinterpreted in the mainstream discourse. It does not mean a
desire to return through the years to some historic way of life. Aboriginal
traditions and cultures are neither static nor frozen in time. It is not a backwardlooking desire.... Traditional perspectives include the view that the past and all its
experiences inform the present reality.

See also Russel Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, "The Supreme Court's
Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal
993; John Borrows, "Frozen Rights in Canada. Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster"
(1997) 22 American Indian Law Review 37.
35. It might be argued that the inalienability of Aboriginal title (see text accompanying note
13, supra) is also an imposed limitation that is paternalistic (I am grateful to Professor
Kenneth Avio for bringing this argument to my attention). There are, however, other
explanations for this restriction.
First, inalienability may be an incorrect characterization of this aspect of Aboriginal
title, as it appears to be more a prohibition against acquisition of Aboriginal title by private
persons

23

than a limitation on Aboriginal title itself. see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) (hereinafter Common Law Aboriginal Title), 221-35. This
is in keeping with the communal nature of Aboriginal title: see text accompanying note 31,
supra.
Secondly, Aboriginal title may be encompassed within an over-arching title to territory
that includes sovereign powers of self-government: see "Aboriginal Rights in Canada", supra
note 33. If it were possible to alienate lands so that they ceased to be part of an Aboriginal
nation's territory, that would involve surrender of jurisdiction over those lands. Jurisdiction is
surrenderable only to another sovereign entity, such as another Aboriginal nation or the
Crown, not to private persons. So the restriction on alienation other than by surrender to the
Crown (or another Aboriginal nation) is in keeping with the sovereign status of the Aboriginal
nations: see Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823) (U.S.S.C.); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831) (U.S.S.C.); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832) (U.S.S.C.)
(note, however, that in Johnson v. M'Intosh, at 593, Marshall CJ. suggested that alienation of
Indian land to a private person would bring that person under the jurisdiction of the Indian
nation insofar as that land was concerned). The first explanation given above is consistent
with this jurisdictional explanation because both depend on the incapacity of private persons
to acquire Aboriginal title rather than on a limitation on Aboriginal title or on the capacity of
Aboriginal nations.
As Kenneth Avio has suggested in the context of fishing rights, a third nonpaternalistic explanation for inalienability is that this aspect of Aboriginal rights, rather than
being imposed on the Aboriginal peoples, was tacitly agreed to by them in order to preserve
their cultures: see K.L. Avio, "Aboriginal Property Rights in Canada: A Contractarian
Interpretation of R. v. Sparrow" (1994) 20:4 Canadian Public Policy 415. This explanation is
also consistent with Aboriginal sovereignty: see Worcester v. Georgia, supra, at 561, where
Marshall CJ. said that "a weaker power does not surrender its independence - its right to selfgovernment, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection." Moreover, it is
supported by recent research revealing that a large number of Aboriginal nations agreed to the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 (providing, among other things, that only the Crown could
acquire Aboriginal lands: see text following note 5, supra) at Niagara in 1764: see Borrows,
supra note 5.
36. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 69 (para. 145). Note that, while Lamer CJ. referred to
assertion of sovereignty, I think he really meant acquisition of sovereignty, as that is when the
Crown's underlying title would have vested. Also, as he did not mention the French Crown in
this context, it is arguable that, even in French Canada, the relevant time for proof of
Aboriginal occupation is assertion of British, not French, sovereignty. For further discussion,
see "Aboriginal Rights in Canada", supra note 33.
37. Van der Peet, supra note 14. For further discussion, see "Aboriginal Rights in Canada",
supra note 33. However, the date of Crown sovereignty can be debated as well: see Kent
McNeil, "Aboriginal Nations and Quebec's Boundaries: Canada Couldn't Give What It Didn't
Have", in Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Quebec
(Toronto: Lorimer, 1992), 107; Mei Lin Ng, "Convenient Illusions: A Consideration of
Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Right of Self-Government", LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 1994, 2-69.
24

38. See Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, esp. ch. 2. It is therefore unnecessary
for claimants to Aboriginal title to meet the integral to the distinctive culture test laid down in
Van der Peet (see supra note 14), because "the requirement that the land be integral to the
distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed by the requirement of occupancy":
Delgamuukw, supra note 6, per Lamer CJ. at 68-69 (para. 142); see also 71-72 (para. 15051).
39. See Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, at 197-204.
40. Cadija Umma v. S. Don Manis Appu, [19391 A.C. 136 (P.C.), per Sir George Rankin at
141-42.
41. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 71 (para. 149), quoting Brian Slattery, " Understanding
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 64 Canadian Bar Review 727, at 758.
42. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72 (para. 152).
43. This is in keeping with common law principles, whereby proof of present occupation
raises a rebuttable presumption of title: see Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of
the Laws of England., or a Commentary upon Littleton, 19th ed., edited by Charles Butler
(London: J.& W.T. Clarke et al, 1832), 239a, Butler's n.1; William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 21st ed. (London: Sweet, Maxwell and Stevens &
Norton, 1844), Vol. 2, 196, Vol. 3, 177, 180; Kent McNeil, "A Question of Title: Has the
Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?" (1990) 16 Monash
University Law Review 91, esp. 104, 107-110;Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35,
esp. 42-49, 218-20, 277-79, 298; Calder, supra note12, per Hall J. (dissenting on other
grounds) at 375. However, the authorities go further than Lamer CJ., as adverse claimants
generally have to show a better title in themselves to rebut the presumption arising from
present occupation: e.g. see Roe d Haldane and Urry v. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2484 (K.B.),
at 2487-88; Goodtitle d Parker v. Baldwin (1809), 11 East 488 (K-B.), at 495; Danford v.
McAnulty (1883), 8 App. Cas. 456 (H.L), at 460-62, 464-65. Put another way, as against those
who cannot show a better right themselves, occupation is a sufficient title: see Asher v.
Whitlock (1865), L.R. 1 Q.B. 1 (Q.B.); Mussammat Sundar v. Mussammat Parbati (1889),
L.R. 16 I.A. 186 (P.C.), at 193. Moreover, these principles apply against the Crown as well as
against other adverse claimants: see Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.);
Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] A.C. 561 (P.C.), at 576; Perry v. Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73
(P.C.). So if an Aboriginal people is in present occupation of land, the burden should be on
the Crown to rebut the presumption of title by showing that the lands were vacant at the time
the Crown acquired sovereignty. See also infra note 100.
44. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72-73 (para. 153), citing Van der Peet, supra note 14, at
206 (para. 65), and Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Aust. H.C).
45. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 72 (para. 153). On this unwillingness in British Columbia,
see generally Fisher, supra note 1; Tennant, supra note 3; Hamar Foster, "Letting Go the
Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia", in Hamar Foster and John McLaren,
25

eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol. VI, British Columbia and the Yukon
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Osgoode Society, 1995), 28. Where Aboriginal
peoples were wrongfully dispossessed, they should be able to rely on their occupation at the
time to establish their title: see generally Common Law Aboriginal Title, 15-78.
46. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at (para. 156).
47. Ibid., at 74 (para. 158).
48.See esp. Canadian Pacific, supra note 19, at 677. For discussion, see "Meaning of
Aboriginal Title", supra note 21, at 142-43.
49. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 67 (para. 138).
50. Ibid., at 73 (para. 155).
51. See supra note 22.
52. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (hereinafter Sparrow).
53. Ibid., at 1113, 1114-16. See also R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 65 (S.C.C)
(hereinafter Gladstone), at 88-101 (para. 54-84); R. v. Adams, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (S.C.C), at
22 23 (para. 56-59); R. v. Cote, [1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Cote), at 58-59
(para. 81 83).
54. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977). Interestingly,
in Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1119, the Court echoed the title of Dworkin's book, without
mentioning it, in a passage stating that the objective of the requirement of priority is to
guarantee that government conservation and management of resources (in that case salmon
stocks) "treat aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously."
55. Sparrow, supra note 52, at 187.
56. Legislation would be necessary because a fundamental principle of the rule of law
prevents legal rights, and especially rights of property, from being infringed by executive
action in the absence of unequivocal statutory authority: see Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19
St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.); Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ld, [1952] A.C. 427
(P.C.); Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil,
"Racial Discrimination and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title" (1996) 1 Australian
Indigenous Law Reporter 181 (hereinafter "Racial Discrimination"), esp. 182-90. The
constitutionalization of Aboriginal title means that, in addition, the legislative authorization
must meet the Sparrow test of justification.
57. Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1113.

26

58. Gladstone, supra note 53, at 97 (para. 73) (my emphasis).
59. He distinguished Sparrow, which did give complete priority to Aboriginal food fishing,
because fishing for that purpose contains an internal limitation (an Aboriginal nation can only
consume so much fish), whereas commercial fishing is limited only by "the market and the
availability of the resource": ibid., at 90 (para. 57).
60. Ibid., at 98 (para. 75).
61. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "How Can Infringements of the
Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified)" (1997) 8:2 Constitutional Forum
33.
62. Van der Peet, supra note 14, at 278 (para. 304).
63. Ibid., at 279 (para. 306).
64. Ibid., at 283 (para. 315).
65. Ibid., at 283 (para. 314). She also described the Chief Justice's approach to justification as
"indeterminate and ultimately more political than legal", and "contrary to the intention of the
framers of the constitution": ibid., at 278 - 302), 281 (para. 308).
66. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78 (para. 165) (Lamer C.J.'s emphasis).
67. Ibid., quoting from Gladstone, supra note 53, at 97 (para. 73).
68. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78 (para. 165).
69. See Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing the
Indians", in James Morton Smith, ed., Seventeenth Century America: Essays in Colonial
History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 15; Geoffrey S. Lester,
"Primitivism versus Civilization: A Basic Question in the Law of Aboriginal Rights to Land",
in Carol Brice-Bennett, ed., Our Footprints Are Everywhere: Inuit Land Use and Occupancy
in Labrador (Ottawa: Labrador Inuit Association, 1977), 351; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
American Indian in Western Legal Thought.- Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), esp. 246-49.
70. This power of expropriation did not exist at common law, other than in exceptional
circumstances where necessary for defence: see Blackstone, supra note 43, Vol. 1, 139; Keith
Davies, Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths,
1978), 9-10; Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.)
(hereinafter De Keyser's Royal Hotel; Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate, [1965] A.C. 75
(H.L.).
71. For detailed discussion, see "Racial Discrimination", supra note 56.
27

72.Magna Carta, 17 John (1215), c.29, provided that "[n]o Freeman shall… be disseised of
his Freehold ... but by the lawful judgement of his Peers, or by the law of the Land." As Lord
Parmoor stated in De Keyser's Royal Hotel, supra note 70, at 569, "[s]ince Magna Carta the
estate of a subject in lands or buildings has been protected against the prerogative of the
Crown." For affirmation of the fundamental nature of property rights in English law, see
Blackstone, supra note 43, Vol. 1, at 127-29, 138-40; Herbert Broom, Constitutional Law
Viewed in Relation to Common Law, 2nd ed. by George L. Denman (London: W. Maxwell
and Son, 1885), 225-45; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 197386), Vol. 8 (1974), para. 833; James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right., A
Constitutional History of Property Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), 13-14, 54-55.
73. See text accompanying note 55, supra. Lamer C.J. also referred to Guerin, supra note 13,
in this context.
74. "There is always a duty of consultation": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79 (para. 168). I
am grateful to Professor Peter Russell for bringing this vital point to my attention.
75. Ibid. For a post-Delgamuukw decision finding a duty to consult before lumbering
operations are conducted on land claimed by virtue of Aboriginal title, see Kitkatla Band v.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1460 (Quicklaw) (B.C.S.C.).
76. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79 (para. 168)
77. Ibid., at 79 (para. 169).
78. See text accompanying notes 20-21, supra.
79. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 79-80 (para. 169).
80. In this respect, the protection accorded to Aboriginal title by s.35(l) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 (see supra note 22) resembles the protection accorded to private property by the
taking provision of the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution ("nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation") and by s.51(xxxi) of the
Australian Constitution (empowering the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with
respect to the. "acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose
in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws").
81. In contrast to this, the obligation to pay compensation for the taking of property that is not
constitutionally protected is subject to legislative override, as long as the denial of
compensation is clearly expressed see Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon
Brewery Co., Ltd., [1919] A.C. 744 (H.L.), per Lord Atkinson at 752.
82. Lamer C.J. said the requirement, arising out of the fiduciary duty, that the prior interest of
Aboriginal titleholders be reflected in the distribution of resources, "might entail [among
28

other things] that governments accommodate the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the
development of the resources of British Columbia": Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 78-79
(para. 167).
83. E.g. see the last sentence of the quotation accompanying note 76, supra.
84. 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c.3.
85. See Robert D.J. Pugh, "Are Northern Lands Reserved for the Indians?" (1982) 60
Canadian Bar Review 36; Hamar Foster, "Roadblocks and Legal History, Part II: Aboriginal
Title and s.91(24)" (1996) 54 7he Advocate 531.
86. The case relied on was St. Catherine's Milling, supra note 11. Lamer C.J. also said that, if
Parliament does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal title, the result would be
"most unfortunate", as "the government vested with primary constitutional responsibility for
securing the welfare of Canada's Aboriginal peoples would find itself unable to safeguard one
of the most central of Native interests - their interest in their lands": Delgamuukw, supra note
6, at 83 (para. 176).
87. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 75 (para. 160). Lamer C.J. relied on his own judgment in
Cote, supra note 53, to reach this conclusion. However, it can be argued that Cote was wrong
in this respect because it misapplied R. v. Badger, [1996] 2 C.N.L.R. 77 (S.C.C): see Kent
McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial
Jurisdiction" (hereinafter "Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction"), forthcoming,
Saskatchewan Law Review. See also Albert C. Peeling, "Provincial Jurisdiction After
Delgamuukw", Continuing Legal Education Materials (Vancouver: March, 1998), 2.1, at
2.1.03, where it is pointed out that the provincial law in question in Cote, while it may have
had an incidental effect on an Aboriginal right, did not infringe it.
88. While provincial laws of general application might have a valid incidental effect on
Aboriginal title, to the extent that they actually infringe it they would cross the line into
exclusive federal jurisdiction and so offend the principle of interjurisdictional immunity: see
Peeling, supra note 87, at 2.1.02-03.
89. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 83 (para 177-78).
90. E.g. see Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.) (hereinafter Isaac); Derrickson v.
Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285 (hereinafter Derrickson); Paul v. Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306.
Cases that have found provincial laws to be applicable on reserves have done so by
characterizing those laws as laws in relation to something other than use and possession of
land: e.g. see Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 1031 (labour laws); R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (traffic laws); R. v. Fiddler,
[1994] 1 C.N.L.R. 121 (Sask. Q.B.) (hereinafter Fiddler) (fire safety); Brantford (Township)
v. Doctor, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 49 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (health and safety). Western Industrial
Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd.
29

(1979), 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424 (Alta. S.C., App. Div), might appear to be an exception, but really
it is not because there the Court decided that a leasehold held by a non-Indian on a reserve is
not land "reserved for the Indians". For further discussion of these and other relevant cases,
see "Rethinking Federal and Provincial jurisdiction", supra note 87.
91. Guerin, supra note 13, at 379, cited in Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 60 (para. 120). For
further discussion, see "Meaning of Aboriginal Title", supra note 21, at 148-51.
92. For further discussion, see "Rethinking Federal and Provincial jurisdiction", supra note
87.
93. Referential incorporation of provincial laws in relation to land into federal law might
provide a legislative solution, but according to the case law this has not been not done by s.88
of the Indian Act, supra note 29, because it only makes provincial laws of general application
apply to "Indians", not to "Lands reserved for the Indians": see R. v. Johns (1962), 133 C.C.C.
43 (Sask. C.A.), at 47; Isaac, supra note 90, at 474; Re Park Mobile Homes Sales Ltd. and Le
Greely (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 618 (B.C.C.A.), at 619; Millbrook Indian Band v. Northern
Counties Residential Tenancies Board (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 174 (N.S.S.C.), at 181-83,
affirmed without reference to s.88, sub nom. Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Millbrook
Indian Band (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 230 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.); Palm Dairies Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1979] 2 C.N.L.R. 43 (F.C.T.D.), at 48; The Queen v. Smith, [1980] 4 C.N.L.R. 29
(F.C.A.), at 78, reversed on other grounds, without reference to s.88, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 554;
Fiddler, supra note 90, at 127-28. Although the Supreme Court explicitly avoided this
question in Derrickson, supra note 90, at 297-99, it is unlikely that the Court would overrule
the above decisions on this point, three of which were made by provincial courts of appeal,
and most of which are long-standing. For further discussion, see "Rethinking Federal and
Provincial Jurisdiction", supra note 87; Peeling, supra note 87.
94. E.g. see supra note 43, regarding proof of Aboriginal title.
95. See generally Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 35, esp. ch. 2 and 7.
96. Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 59 (para 117) (my emphasis).
97. As Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. remarked in Sparrow, supra note 52, at 1105, in relation
to s.35(l) generally, "at the least, [it] provides a solid constitutional base upon which
subsequent negotiations can take place." Note that this recognition of the need for
negotiations, which is present in the Delgamuukw decision as well (I am grateful to Professor
Peter Russell for bringing this to my attention), is another indication of tacit acceptance by the
Court that the concept of self-government is inherent in the communal nature of Aboriginal
rights: see text accompanying notes 31-33, supra. This is because the community possessing
the rights needs to be able to choose representatives to participate in the negotiations, and
needs to have a mechanism for ratifying any agreement that is reached. Stated more broadly,
the community must have the political authority to engage with other governments where its
communal rights are involved,
30

and this entails self-government. On the exercise of this authority in relation to the signing of
one of the numbered treaties, see Sharon Venne, "Understanding Treaty 6: An Indigenous
Perspective", in Asch, supra note 21, 173, esp. 189-92. More generally, see Opekokew, supra
note 30, esp. 9-15; Henderson, supra note 30, esp. 256-60.
98. For an overview of these agreements, see RCAP Report, supra note 2, Vol. 2,
Restructuring the Relationship, at 720-32.
99. See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Treaty Making in the Spirit of Coexistence. An Alternative to Extinguishment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995). An
exception is the Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Council
for Yukon Indians and the Government of the Yukon (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada,
1993), by which the Yukon Indian Nations retain their Aboriginal title to a portion of the land
claim area: see RCAP Report, supra note 2, Vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship, at 537-38.
100. E.g. see R. v. Peter Paul, [1998] N.B.J. No. 126 (Quicklaw) (N.B.C.A.), a postDelgamuukw decision where an alleged treaty or Aboriginal right to cut timber failed as a
defence to a charge of unlawfully removing timber from Crown lands, in part because the
accused failed to prove Aboriginal title to the lands where the timber was cut. For critical
perspectives on this issue of onus of proof, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Lands and
Resources: An Assessment of the Royal Commission's Recommendations" (1997) 5:5
Canada Watch 77; Peggy J. Blair, "Prosecuting the Fishery: The Supreme Court of Canada
and the Onus of Proof in Aboriginal Fishing Cases" (1997) 20 Dalhousie Law Journal 17.
See also supra note 43.
101. Provincial governments do not have a constitutional right to be at the table, given that
Lamer C.J. held in Delgamuukw, supra note 6, at 82 (para. 175), that "jurisdiction to accept
surrenders [of Aboriginal title] lies with the federal government". Politically, however, there is
no realistic possibility of viable agreements being reached regarding lands within provincial
boundaries without provincial participation (Professor Peter Russell pointed this out to me in
a personal communication dated April 10, 1998). Moreover, given that the geographic extent
of Aboriginal title is a major issue to be settled and that provincial governments have a direct
interest in that issue, they need to take part in the negotiations.
102. See supra notes 5, 13 and 35, and accompanying text.
103. See text accompanying notes 23-27, supra.
104. The province might be liable as well for breach of the fiduciary duty that the Crown
owes to the Aboriginal peoples: see generally Leonard Ian Rotman, Parallel Paths., Fiduciary
Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996), esp. 244-54.
105. Remember that this would require legislation, as executive action cannot infringe rights
without unequivocal legislative authorization: see supra note 56. Also, legislation of this sort
31

might violate the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44, s.1(a), as it would interfere with
the enjoyment of property in a way that would probably discriminate on the basis of race or
national origin. There is authority in Australia that legislation directed at infringing the
property rights of indigenous peoples is discriminatory, and offends the rights to own and
inherit property that are recognized by Article 5 (v) and (vi) of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 (in force 4 January 1969), which both Australia and Canada have ratified: see Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 1] (1988), 166 C.L.R. 186 (Aust. H.C.), and discussion in "Racial
Discrimination", supra note 56, at 36-38. While Parliament can get around the Canadian Bill
of Rights by resorting to the notwithstanding clause in s.2, the International Convention might
still be offended. In any case, Canada's reputation as a proponent of human rights would be
seriously tarnished.
106. There is a parallel here with the situation the federal government found itself in as a
result of the St. Catherine's Milling decision, supra note 11, whereby the provinces received
the benefits of Indian land surrenders and Canada paid the costs: see Dominion of Canada v.
Province of Ontario, [1910] A.C. 637 (P.C.). The federal government will no doubt want to
avoid getting into a similar predicament in the context of infringement of Aboriginal title by
insisting that the province concerned agrees to pay the costs of compensation. As Albert
Peeling has written (supra note 87, at 2.1.08), in this context "the fiduciary duties and
financial interests of Canada coincide. The two governments will have to negotiate against
one another with respect to money, rather than them both negotiating against the aboriginal
people."
107. See supra note 101.
108. Even where Aboriginal lands are required for public purposes such as highways and
airports, the Aboriginal titleholders could retain an interest so that the lands would revert to
them if they cease to be used for those purposes.
109. See Michael Asch and Norman Zlotkin, "Affirming Aboriginal Title: A New Basis for
Comprehensive Claims Negotiations", in Asch, supra note 21, at 208. In this respect, there is
no reason why Aboriginal title lands should be treated any differently than reserve lands: for
an example (unfortunately tainted by breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligation) of
development of reserve land without an absolute surrender, see Guerin, supra note 13.
110. Unfortunately, preliminary indications do not reveal that this is occurring. The deal
announced by Newfoundland and Quebec in March, 1998, on hydroelectric development of
the Churchill River, in face of Innu protests, is just one example: see Shawn McCarthy, "Innu
short-circuit Labrador ceremony", Globe and Mail, March 10, 1998, Al; Jeffrey Simpson,
"Raining on the Churchill Falls megaproject parade", Globe and Mail, March 10, 1998, A14.
See also Robert Matas, "B.C. favours industry over native land claims", Globe and Mail,
March 14, 1998, A12.

32

